The Japanese industry is in a huge whirlpool. Various common senses and conventions have been seriously doubted. Nevertheless, Japan cannot yet find any exit. Even if finding it, she has spent only a time in vain without doing any effectives measure, because most of those are conflict with vested interests or conventional practices. In this paper, I will make a positive analysis of changing industry in Japan after the babble boom crash in 1991 by using Firms and Establishments Census Data and others. Then, I will make it clear that the cause of failure to buoy up her economy consists in a fact that shortage of investment opportunities in her economy has been misunderstood simply as shortage of macro effective demand. Then, comparing the structural adjustment in the first half of the 1990s with one in the second half of the 1970s, I will clarify that the most serious weak point of Japanese-styled management, which has virtually excluded rights of shareholders from their decisions, have got revealed as her economy matures. I will also say that improvement of profitability by making employment fluid is not only effective as a counter-policy to the prolonged structural depression in the open economy but also inescapable in the "affiuent" economy driven by the service industry. Lastly, in place of a conclusion, I will remind a brief
summary and lessons of the US and the UK policy experiences after the 1970s.